

## DEMOGRAPHY SHAPING THE FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY OF STATES

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In the realist and neo realist paradigm of security analysis, the security is state centric and built on the edifice of military prowess. Situated in an anarchical international system the states are dependent on their own self to protect their existence and existence of the people living within the territorial boundary of the state. Security of the state means the security of the people. The threats to the states are primarily assumed to be emanating from other states. Every state is considered as a potential threat to the other state. On this assumed given that security of state is coeval with the security of the people, all other non-state sources of security threats to the people remained hidden, undermined and did not come to the forefront. These non-state sources of security threats most of them being beyond the control of the state not only challenged the state sovereignty but directly or indirectly became a threat to the people in a variety of ways. Climate change, environmental degradation, fatal diseases, cyber threat and poverty can be considered as non-traditional security threats.

Here the people assumed to be homogenous group equal in needs, aspirants, and status and capacity gender and age structure with the passage of time proved to be a myth to be busted. It come out soon that the people supposed to live in unity "group" within the boundaries of state are very much heterogeneous, asymmetrical in terms of education, economic condition, sex, age structure, inherent capacity, need and aspirations. Of all these the population age structure i.e. demography which was not even conceived of as a security threat has in recent years come out as a very significant factor in security analysis. Variant in geographic age structure can be itself a non-traditional non-state centric source of security threat having dangerous impacts on the stability of the state. Population of the state can be divided into various age groups called who a size and depending on which age out numbers of others the established political system and security structure are likely to be at risk being affected and reshaped.

Demographic defined as "the study of the size, composition and distribution of population in relation to both in government and politics" is under represented in political science (Weiner and Testelbaum 2001: 11-12). Nowhere this is so glaringly underestimated than in the field of international relation. With the end of cold war the

growing realistic about non-applicability of weapons, and rise of non-traditional security threats killing and affecting more people than the conventional and nuclear warfare, has brought demographic age structure to the core of foreign policy making. "Today it dominates almost any discussion of long term fiscal, economic or foreign policy direction" (Jauscum, Howe et al. 2008" 17). Ten years ago global aging was hardly on the radar scene of most developed world political force due to unprecedented global demographic turbulence that is likely to crest around 2050.

The countries today seem to be perched and slide towards an era of hyper aging and population decline. By 2030, the elderly people are projected to comprise 23 percent of the world's population, up from 16 percent today. By 2050, the share will rise to 27 percent and in Japan and some fast aging countries of Western Europe it will be passing 35 percent. By middle of this century, at least half of Americans will be of age of 40 and at least half of Europeans will be over age 50. It has been seen that working age populations in almost every demographic country will shrink and decline, the only major exception being the US. By the mid 2020s, total major populations will also peak and plateau and begin to decline in most countries. Japan and some Europe nations are on track to lose nearly one-half of their total current populations by the end of the century. (How New and Richard Jackson, Demography and Geopolitics: Lend standing Today's Debate in its historical and intellectual context," in Goldstone Jack A. et al ed. Political Demography: How population change are reshaping international security and National Politics (New York: Oxford University, Breos, 2012; pp31-32).

During 2000-10 what is most visibly in frontline of debate about population declined linked with nation of power. Both academics and general public has begun seriously thinking about the long term of implication of demographic change. One two decades ago global aging was hardly or the policy agenda of most developed world policy makers. Today it heads the front line of the agenda of policy making with its term fiscal, economic and foreign policy implication whether at G-7 economic summit, at NATO summits of US department of defence strategy, global demographic trends the discussed. On the domestic front is discussed seriously about the impact of

demographic changes on employment, infrastructure, pension, health care and other social security issues.

At the international level is heard about use of new idioms birth wars, patriotism, youth bulges, youth deficit, women, population implosion, aging recessions and budgetary greying with pronounced emphasis on their implication on stability and security of the political system. Over the last decade many countries such as Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain and the United Kingdom started enacting social policy reforms that would put primacy on giving women an additional inducement to have more children. Vladimir Spidla, the European Union's commissioner for employment and social affairs has asked that all new EU policies be evaluated for their effect on birth-rates and family formation.

Population and Power: An Ancient Preoccupation

Demographic change shapes political power like water shapes rock. Up close the force looks trivial, but viewed from a distance of decades or centuries it moves mountains. To illustrate how dramatically populations can displace each other over time, the historian Eugene M. Kulischer once reminded his readers that in 900 AD Berlin had no Germans, Moscow had no Russians, Budapest had no Hungarians, Madrid was a Moorish settlement, and Constantinople had hardly any Turks. He added that the Normans had not yet settled in Britain, and that before the sixteenth century there were no Europeans living in North or South America, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa (Kulischer 1948). As Mark Steyn pithily remarks, "Demographics is a game of last man standing" (2006, p. 3).

That population change contributes to the rise and fall of nations and empires is a fact of great antiquity. That policy leaders and their advisers often ponder its contribution and strive to influence it is also a fact of great antiquity. We approach these facts in reverse order. We look first at what societies have thought and said about population and power and then at what (if anything) the past actually teaches us about their connection. Not surprisingly, later religions at least those that endured to play a major role in history continued to encourage large families. This is true of all of the major monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Zoroastrianism), as well as of Confucianism. In his classic history of population doctrines, Charles Stangland explains: "Injunctions similar to Jehovah's command, 'Increase and multiply,' are found in the religions of practically every ancient nation.

When the early leaders of political states began to design or enact explicit population policies, they did not

need to invent new directives so much as co-opt directives that were already entrenched in the prevailing culture. The rulers of Sumer and Babylonia gave fertility cults official status and installed them on the ziggurats. The great lawgivers Hammurabi, Lycurgus, and Solon codified family norms in a manner that (in the opinion of some scholars) favoured higher birth-rates. Ancient writers frequently relate, through anecdote, the brutal pronatalism of ancient leaders. In his account of Pericles' famous oration, Thucydides has him tell Athenian women that the best way they can help in wartime is to bear more children. According to Plutarch, Philip of Macedon passed a law forcing his subjects to marry early to fill the future ranks of his army; his son Alexander the Great likewise ordered thousands of his conquering soldiers to marry Persians. (At nearly the same time, the Confucian forerunner Mo Zi was arguing in China that all men should be compelled to marry at age 20, all women at age 15.) Plutarch also tells the story of another Macedonian, Pyrrhus of Epirus, whose "Pyrrhic victories against the Roman republic were to no avail. Due to Rome's prodigious birth-rate, its losses could be effortlessly replaced after every battle.

Lessons of History: The Intellectual Tradition

A number of useful themes emerge from this retrospect that will add some historical depth to today's rising new interest in the impact of demographic aging – and, in some nations, demographic decline – on national power.

First, the issue of population and power has an ancient pedigree. Political leaders have worried about it since the dawn of civilization. Over the centuries, moreover, their concern has almost always been to avoid population decline and to encourage population growth. From time to time, great minds have a dissenting point of view (Aristotle, for example, once famously wrote that "a great state is not the same as a populous state, but there is little evidence that leaders listened to such advice (Aristotle's illustrious Macedonian did not).

Second, to the extent that populations have yielded to an antigrowth agenda, it has done so in eras of unusual population growth. This explains the ascendancy of Malthusianism after the late eighteenth century – not Europe but in China as well, which also experienced rapid population beginning around 1750 (Wang 1999). This also explains why, even – the last two centuries, the direction of thinking and policy has tended to shift back and forth with the prevailing demographic outlook.

Third, the favourite policy prescriptions for encouraging population growth have actually changed

very little over the centuries. The senate and emperors of Rome enacted monetary bounties for families with many children, monetary penalties for bachelors, and status-enhancing inducements (like citizenship) for immigrants. Fifteen hundred years later, Louis XIV's finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, was recommending the same menu of options. And in the capitals of today's developed countries, one finds plenty of policy working rappers still pushing a similar program. Even brutal measures of "demographic engineering" such as deportation, relocation, colonization, and genocide, have not changed much. Germany and the Soviet Union used them in the twentieth century. So did the Assyrians, Romans, Mongols, and Turks in earlier centuries.

Fourth, leaders have been perpetually disappointed by their population policies by how they fail so much more often than they succeed. This has triggered an endless debate over the centuries about how to influence behaviour more effectively. The debate has typically pitted paternalists, who believe that people can be made to do their demographic "duty" mostly by means of commands or bribes, against liberals, who believe that better results will come from giving people more economic opportunity and a broader range of social and lifestyle freedom. To raise birth-rates, some today advocate policies that would reinforce an exclusive maternal role for women, while others advocate policies that would give women more choices (such as having a career while also raising children). History's track record shows that, though it is the paternalistic policies that have usually been enacted, it is the liberal policies that have usually been more effective.

Finally, from ancient times to the present day, there has always been uncertainty about the direction of causation. Does population growth cause a state to be successful at home and abroad? Or is it the other way around that is, does a state that is successful (for whatever deep social or cultural reason) merely experience population growth as a dimension of that success? Leaders have usually leaned toward the first answer, because they like to believe that they are in control of the state's destiny. Yet ancient philosophers often inclined toward the second answer. Many believed in an organic metaphor for the polis: Political societies, like human beings, experience birth, growth, maturity, senescence, and death. Young societies are simple, innocent, virtuous, egalitarian, and tend to have many youths. Old societies are complex, experienced, and decadent, stratified, and tend to have many elders. In time, all societies naturally cycle from young to old, and it is not clear whether policy-makers can do much to change that.

Among the Greeks, Polybius subscribed to this cyclical view of social and political evolution; among the Romans, Tacitus, Juvenal, and even Petronius; in the Middle Ages, Ibn Khaldun; in the Renaissance, Machiavelli. In the 1920s and 1930s, we associate this view with Oswald Spengler's (1918) *The Decline of the West*. In our own day, we may think of Joseph Tainter's (1988) *The Collapse of Complex Societies* or simply Jared Diamond's (2005) *Collapse*. What all of these interpretations have in common is the idea that social evolution demography included is governed by a meta-historical dynamic that may not allow much room for leaders or citizens themselves to intervene. Although this doctrine is not one that policymakers will accept easily, it also offers some humbling insights that they would do well not to ignore entirely.

#### Realism and Idealism in an Aging World

Many are uncomfortable with the proposition that demography shapes the rise its fall of nations, since it seems to hand much of our fate over to the blind 'crises of multiplication, acquisition, and absorption. There is no denying that geographic change as a force in history has always been considered a staple: the realist school. It is linked to concerns about group survival having deep roots in our biology. It tends to focus more on the ability to prevail and dominate rather than the ability to influence and cooperate. It is sometimes used to justify traditional family structures (as pronatalist) and criticize new and unconventional social norms (as antinatalist). Realists like to say that we can never escape the limits of what the world is, while idealists might complain that excessive focus on population and power is likely to distract us from what the world could be or ought to be.

Today, however, this contrast can be greatly overdrawn. Contemporary social scientists, unlike classical realists, use a method that is both historical and global. They follow the path of each country's social and economic development and acknowledge that the geopolitical order depends upon a working 'world system, they do not just focus on how demographic change determines numbers and wealth, but also on how it affects attitudes and aspirations. If, as many realists believe, demographic trends are likely to push today's developed nations into a position of geopolitical weakness, then it may be even more vital that they begin to pursue such idealist goals as acting in concert with each other and inviting certain rising developing nations into their fold.

Both Schools, realist and idealist, have been slow to focus on the massive topographic riptide due to sweep

over the world during the next several decades. Both need to get busy – improving the long-term projections, debating their implications, and determining the best strategic responses. Preparing to global aging will call on contributions from all schools of thought. It is a mission that will challenge the planning skills of every policymaker and the leadership skills of every statesperson.

Table 16.1 Fertility Rates by Country

Country	Years 2005-2010	When Went Below Replacement
Japan	1.32	1975-1980
Germany	1.36	1970-1975
Russia	1.44	1965-1970
China	1.64	1990-1995
United Kingdom	1.83	1970-1975
France	1.97	1975-1980
United States	2.07	1970-1975

Social aging is a product of two long-term demographic trends: decreasing fertility rates and increasing life expectancies. Fertility rates are the average number of children per woman in a given country. For a state to sustain its current population numbers (assuming zero net immigration), fertility levels must be at 2.1 or higher. Today the United States is the only great power that comes close to meeting this requirement, and most are well below this number and have been for decades (see Table 16.1).

The scope of the aging process in the great powers is remarkable. By 2050, it least 20 percent of the citizens in these states will be over 65.<sup>1</sup> In Japan more than one out of every three people will be over this age. As societal aging progresses over the next half century, the populations in Germany, Japan, and Russia are expected to shrink significantly. Russia's population is already decreasing by nearly 200,000 people per year, and Germany and Japan are also currently experiencing absolute population decline (United Nations Population Division 2011).

It is worth stressing that predictions for aging in the great powers are unlikely to be wrong. The reason for this certainty is simple: The elderly of the future are already born. Consequently, absent some global natural disaster, disease pandemic, or other worldwide calamity, the number of people in the world who are over 65 will increase dramatically in coming decades. Only major increases in immigration rates or fertility levels will prevent this inevitable rise in the number of elderly from resulting in significant increases in states' median ages. Either outcome is unlikely, however. Immigration rates in the great powers for the next 50 years would have to be orders of magnitude higher than historical levels to prevent

population aging (United Nations Population Division 2000). Significant increases in fertility would represent a reversal of a centuries-long trend in the industrialized world, and one that has existed in many states despite the existence of pronatalist governmental policies (Demery 1999). Aging in the most powerful actors in the system is, in short, a virtual inevitability.<sup>1</sup>

Although aging in the great powers is virtually inevitable, how states respond to this phenomenon is not. The following analysis of the economic and fiscal costs of global aging and the consequent effects on international power distributions are forecasts, not predictions. This chapter's analysis, in other words, is based on extrapolations of current trends. If governments adopt effective countermeasures, outcomes could change for the better. I mention some of these potential remedies at the chapter's end, and Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba discusses these more thoroughly in her chapter in this volume.

Two points on this subject must be stressed, however. First, the costs created by population aging in the great powers are extremely high, thus the policies necessary to counteract the negative effects of this phenomenon must be equally ambitious. Second, there are powerful incentives that work against adopting "aging reforms," most notably the moral pressure of depriving poor seniors of reasonable standards of welfare and the political pressure against taking resources away from a large constituency. Taken together, these facts make the forces working for the continuation of current trends on the subject of population aging very strong. Although most governments in the industrialized world have made policy changes to increase the viability and reduce the costs of their welfare systems for the elderly, none of the great powers has thus far adopted reforms that eliminate the huge gap between anticipated expenditures for the aged and resources set aside for these costs (Capretta 2007; Haas 2007, pp. 123-124).

We are already witnessing this dynamic. For example, even though China is currently the youngest of the great powers, it is experiencing labour shortages that are threatening economic growth. These shortages are due in large part to the aging of China and reductions in the number of 15 to 35 year olds (Bradsher 2007). Experts predict that shrinkage in China's working-age population will result in a loss of 1 percent per year from this state's GDP growth by the 2020s (Jackson 2005). The economic forecasts are even more dire for Germany and Japan, where massively contracting labour forces could result in overall GDP growth of roughly 1 percent in

coming decades (Lombard Street Research Monthly Economic Review 2003).

Compounding these problems, significant social aging may also limit productivity growth. The elderly are likely to be more conservative with their investments than younger people. The more risk averse a society's investment portfolio is, the less entrepreneurship that will be funded, and thus the lower the gains in productivity that should be expected. National savings rates may also shrink in aging states as large numbers of seniors spend down their savings. The Japanese government, for example, has already reported that national savings rates are down substantially from previous levels due to social aging and seniors' consumption of their savings (Yomiuri Simbun 2003). Reduced savings rates may lead to rising interest rates and ultimately to reduced rates of productivity increases (England 2002).

In addition to slowing economic growth, an even more important economic effect of social aging is the strain that it places on governmental resources. All governments in the industrialized world have made commitments to pay for substantial portions of the retirement and health care costs of their elderly citizens. The projected increases in governmental spending for the elderly in coming decades are sobering. Annual public benefits to the elderly (both pension and health care) as a percentage of GDP are forecasted to rise by 2040 by 15 percent in Japan (to an overall percentage of 27); by 13 percent in France (to an overall percentage of 29); by 11 percent in the United States (to an overall percentage of 20); by 10 percent in Germany (to an overall percentage of 26); and by 6 percent in Britain (to an overall percentage of 18) (Jackson and Howe 2003, p. 7).

These costs will be an increase of hundreds of billions of dollars to governments' annual expenditures for many decades. To give some perspective on their magnitude, consider the following. By 2040, the annual amount of money that the great powers will have to spend on elder care is going to increase many times what these states currently spend on their militaries, even after adjusting for inflation. Germany will have to increase its annual spending on elder care more than 7 times what it currently spends on defence. France will have to spend more than 5 times as much, and Japan more than 15 times as much (Haas 2007, pp. 120-121).

Given the magnitude of the costs created by the great powers' aging populations, substantial increases in the future in these states' expenditures for economic

development and defence are unlikely. We are, in fact, already witnessing in the oldest of the great powers the crowding out of military spending for elderly circle. Despite concerns about growing Chinese power and North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, Japan reduced its defence budget every year from 2003 to 2008. In December 2004, Japan cut military spending by 3.7 percent from the average of the previous five budgets. The cuts were engineered by finance ministry officials "who demanded more social spending for Japan's rapidly aging population" (Brooke 2004).

The following December the defence budget was reduced by another 0.9 percent to help pay for the "growing burdens resulting] from an aging population" (Xinhua General News Service 2005). In fact, the Japanese government has stated that by 2015 general expenditures will have to be cut by 25 to 30 percent "to cope with inevitable increases in social security-related spending given the nation's rapidly aging population" "30% Cut in Spending Needed to Balance Japan's Finances in 10 Years" 2005). Similar pressure for cuts in defence spending to finance elder-care costs: is building in Germany and France. In February 2006 the EU Commission warned Germany that it had to cut substantially discretionary spending across the board "to cope with the costs of an aging population" (White 2006). Germany's finance minister, Peer Steinbrueck, speaking on behalf of the government, agreed with this analysis and promised to put the commission's recommendations into practice. Also in 2006 the French president requested the creation of a new body, the Public Finance Guidance Council.

The council's primary purpose is to reduce France's national debt, which has grown significantly in recent years largely due to increasing costs for elder care. The institution's main policy recommendation is to reduce to a substantial degree expenditures "of all public players," including the military (Office of the Prime Minister, France 2006).

The crowding out of military and economic development spending for increased care for the elderly is not the only way in which population aging is likely to affect global power distributions. Social aging is also likely to push militaries to spend more on personnel and less on other areas, including weapons development and procurement. This is important because no nation will be able to challenge U.S. military dominance without the ability to wage highly technologically sophisticated warfare (Posen 2003). When states are forced to spend

more of their military budgets on personnel than on research, development, and weapons procurement, the odds of continued U.S. military primacy increase substantially.

The oldest of the great powers are already devoting significantly more resources to military personnel than weapons purchases and research. Since 1995, both France and Germany have dedicated nearly 60 percent of their military budgets to personnel. Germany spends nearly 4 times as much on personnel as weapons procurement; France, Japan, and Russia roughly 2.5 times more. The United States, in contrast, dedicates less than 1.3 times more money to personnel than weapons purchases (Haas 2007, pp. 140-141).

(Population aging is a key cause of increasing military personnel costs for two main reasons. First, as society's age, more people exit the workforce than enter it. Increasing numbers of retirees in relation to new workers are likely to create labour shortages relative to previous levels of employment. The result of this trend will be increased competition among businesses and organization including the military to hire workers. Consequently, if states' militaries want to be able to attract and keep the best employees, they are going to have to pay more to do so. A 2006 report endorsed by EU defence ministers made precisely these points, stating that the aging of Europe's populations will "inevitably" lead to rising military personnel per capita costs if European forces are to remain effective (European Defence Agency 2006, p. 6).

A second factor that is increasing states' military personnel costs at the expense of weapons procurement is the aging of the military itself. The great powers' pension obligations to retired military personnel are considerable. Russia, for example, in the 2000s consistently spent significantly more on military retirees than on either weapons procurement or military research and development (Haas 2007, p. 142). Similarly, rising pension costs are the second most important reason for increases in Chinese military spending in the last decade (after pay increases for active personnel), according to China's government (People's Republic of China 2004b).

Growing pension costs for military retirees are important for international power relationships because these expenditures, which are not one-time costs but ones that government will have to pay every year for many decades, do nothing to increase states' power-projection capabilities. Every dollar spent on retirees is one less dollar that can be spent on weapons, research, or active

personnel. Consequently, every dollar spent in this area by the other great powers increases the likelihood of the continuation of U.S. primacy

The relatively youthful demographics of the United States will help greatly with the fiscal challenges created by social aging. The United States' growing labour force, which will remain larger than that of other countries relative to its retirees over the next 50 years (see Table 4.5), will contribute to an expanding economy, thereby providing the government with additional revenue without having to increase taxes, borrow more money, or cut other spending. In addition, America's public welfare commitments to the elderly are relatively modest compared with those of other industrialized powers (Peterson 1999, pp. 79-80; Jackson 2003, p. 3); and its tax burden is low compared with those of these other states (OECD 2009).

Nevertheless, as burdensome as the public costs of aging will be for the rifted States, the public benefits (pension and health care) owed to U.S. seniors 15 percentage of GDP will likely remain substantially lower than in most of the other great powers (Jackson and Howe 2003, p. 7). Moreover, America should be in a better position to pay for these costs than the other major actors in the system. Global aging, despite its costs for American interests, will therefore be a powerful force for the continuation of the relative power dominance of the United States.

Both the opportunities and challenges for U.S. security in an aging world are substantial. The aging crisis in the United States is less acute than in the other great powers, and its ability to pay the costs associated with this phenomenon is significantly better than these states. These facts, however, should neither disguise the magnitude of these costs for America nor lull U.S. leaders into inaction on this critical issue.

The more the United States maintains its enviable demographic position compared with the other great powers) and relatively superior ability to pay for the costs associated with its elderly population, the more it will be able both to preserve its own position of international power dominance and to help other states address their aging (and other) problems when it is in U.S. interests to do so. Given these objectives, America should raise the retirement age to reflect increases in life expectancies, reduce Social Security and Medicare payments to wealthier citizens, maintain largely open immigration policies to help keep its median age relatively low, and restrain the rising costs of its health care system.

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Although the need for reform on the aging issue is clear and compelling, U.S. politicians have failed to lead on this subject. The immigration reform bill failed to pass Congress in 2007; major Social Security reform has not occurred since the 1980s; and Medicare "reform" has mostly expanded obligations. The 2003 prescription drug benefits legislation, for example, increased the program's unfunded liability by \$16.2 trillion.<sup>5</sup>

The longer U.S. leader's delay addressing the growing gap between elder care obligations and resources set aside to pay for them, the more painful these policies will be when they come. Such delay may negate the otherwise substantial demographic advantages America enjoys in relation to the other great powers. However, proactive policies that are designed both to take full advantage of the opportunities created by global aging and to mitigate the costs created by this phenomenon will be a major support to U.S. security throughout the twenty-first century.

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